- Moral hazard, adverse selection and principal agent theory
- Asymmetric information and credit market
- Solidarity networks and reciprocity
- Dynamic games: extensive forms, sequential moves and the game tree, subgame
perfection, imperfect information games and sequential equilibrium.
- Static games and Bayes-Nash equilibrium
- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
- Adverse selection, signaling and screening models refinements.
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